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STATEMENT OF APPELLATE COURT f S JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal
pursuant to §§ 78-2-2(4) and 78-2a-3(2)(j) of the Utah Code.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs' statement of the issues does not clearly state
the issues relevant to defendants Linda D. Milne and Western
Surety Company.

Plaintiffs' brief only makes limited, sporadic

references to these defendants' involvement in the underlying
transaction.

Because of their limited involvement, the issues

concerning these .defendants are also necessarily narrow.

As to

these defendants, the only issue suggested by the plaintiffs'
brief is:
Whether the District Court properly found
that the undisputed facts established as a
matter of law that defendant Linda D. Milne's
conduct did not cause plaintiffs to

lose

their property through foreclosure.
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
In reviewing a summary judgement, the app€*llate court
applies the same standard that is applied by a trial court in
ruling on a motion for summary judgment.

Summary judgment will

be affirmed where the undisputed facts establish as a matter of
law that the moving party is entitled to judgment.
Holcomb, 740 P.2d 281, 283 (Utah App. 1987).

1

See Briggs v.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES,
RULES AND REGULATIONS
The statutes and rules relevant to this appeal are Rule 56
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 33 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure, Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial
Administration, Section 57-1-6 of the Utah Code (repealed
effective July 1, 1988), and Section 57-3-2 of the Utah Code.
These statutes and rules are set forth in their entirety in
Addendum I hereto.
STATEMENT OF CASE
Defendants Linda D. Milne and Western Surety Co. disagree
with plaintiffs' statement of the case as it relates to these
defendants and therefore submit the following:
A.

Nature of the Case.
This case arises out of a simple lease financing transaction

for the acquisition of a Sodick Model Electrical Discharge
Machine ("machine").

Plaintiffs' son-in-law, Robert J. Lucking,

intended to use this machine to start a business. Plaintiffs1
son-in-law, acquired the machine, worth $77,000.00, through the
lease financing transaction.

Robert Lucking Deposition at 12,

38, 94-95, 97.
Plaintiffs became involved in the acquisition of the machine
when plaintiff Dale Larson agreed to assist plaintiffs* son-inlaw in obtaining financing for the business and the machine.
Dale Larson Deposition at 18-20, 50, Grethe Larson Deposition at
34-38, Robert Lucking Deposition at 12. As a result, plaintiffs

2

executed various documents related to the acquisition and
financing of the machine.

Amended Fourth Amended Complaint

Paragraphs 5, 6, & Exhibits A-G (R. 393, 401-410) ("Complaint").
Among the documents' executed by the plaintiffs were a lease on
the machine and a deed of trust on the plaintiffs' property.1
Although admittedly signing several documents in connection with
the transaction, plaintiff Dale Larson denies signing the lease
or deed of trust.

Dale Larson Deposition at 14-15, 38-39, 42-44.

Plaintiff Grethe Larson admits signing her own name to the deed
of trust and also signing her husband's name to the deed of trust
and the lease.

Grethe Larson Deposition at 58-60, 69-70, 73-76.

Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, that they were fraudulently
induced to sign the documents.

Although plaintiffs claim that

they were wrongfully induced into signing the documents, they do
not claim that defendant Linda Milne made any representation to
them concerning the transaction nor that she participated in the
wrongful inducement.

Rather, their only claim against defendant

Milne is that she improperly notarized the deed of trust.2
Appellants' Brief at p. 6.

x

Grethe Larson in fact signed her name and her husband's name
on two different deeds of trust. Grethe Larson Deposition at 6970, 73-76. The existence of two deeds of trust is not relevant to
this appeal and has played no role in the claims against defendants
Milne and Western Surety.
2

Defendant Western Surety issued a notary bond and is a party
to this action solely because of that bond.
3

After plaintiff's son-in-law defaulted on the lease,
Overland initiated a non-judicial foreclosure on plaintiffs'
property securing performance of the lease.

Plaintiffs initiated

the instant litigation to stop the foreclosure.

The District

Court denied plaintiffs' request for preliminary relief and the
foreclosure sale was completed.
Plaintiffs continued this litigation against defendants
Overland, Milne, and Western Surety seeking to recover damages.
After five amendments to the Complaint, plaintiffs had
sufficiently plead a claim against Milne and Western Surety to
require an answer.
381, 392-413).

(R. 002-003, 155-58, 245-51, 278-88, 332-35,

Plaintiffs' only claim against defendant Milne is

that she improperly notarized the deed of trust and that, as a
result, Overland foreclosed on the property.

Appellants' Brief

at p. 6.
B.

Disposition Below.
After substantial discovery including the depositions of the

plaintiffs and their son-in-law,3 defendants Milne and Western
Surety Company filed a Motion for Summary Judgment.

(R. 573-75).

Through this motion, defendants demonstrated that the plaintiffs'
deposition testimony and the complaint's allegations established,
as a matter of law, that no action of Milne caused plaintiffs to

3

Discovery did not proceed smoothly.
The defendants were
forced to file various motions to compel the plaintiffs'
participation in discovery and the District Court issued an order
granting sanctions for Plaintiffs' failure to attend a deposition.
(R. 500, 821-23).
4

lose their property.

(R. 576-84).

Plaintiffs filed no response

to this motion and did not controvert the law or facts supporting
the motion.

The District Court therefore granted summary

judgment dismissing the complaint as to defendants Milne and
Western Surety.

(R. 621, 845).

On March 1, 1990, the District Court entered the summary
judgment order.

See Addendum II.

(R. 845). On June 26, 1990,

the trial court, on its own motion, certified this summary
judgement as a finial appealable order.

(R. 1037).

Subsequently, plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal, in part,
appealing the summary judgment for Milne and Western Surety.

(R.

1047).
C.

Statement of Material Facts4
In the spring of 1984, plaintiffs1 son-in-law, Robert J.

Lucking ("Lucking" or "plaintiffs1 son-in-law") decided to

4

In the Motion for Summary Judgment, dafendants Milne and
Western Surety assumed that the following facts found in
plaintiffs1 Amended Fourth Amended Complaint and in the depositions
were true and correct.
(R. 578-81).
This assumption was made
solely because the plaintiffs can not prevail under their own
version of the facts.
Defendants Milne and Western Surety
expressly reserved the right to contest any fact: in the event that
a trial became necessary.
(R. 578). For example, Milne denies
that the notarization was improper and that Dale did not sign the
Lease and Deed of Trust.
Since plaintiffs did not controvert theses facts, they were
accepted as true by the District Court and are accepted as true
for the purposes of this appeal.
See Utah Code of Judicial
Administration Rule 4-501(2)(b) (uncontroverted facts deemed
admitted for purpose of summary judgment motion). Thus, the record
citations in this factual statement are to defendants1 Memorandum
of Points and Authorities In Support of Summary Judgment (R. 056784), to the depositions and to the pleadings.
5

purchase a Sodick Model Electrical Discharge Machine with which
to start a business.
579).

Robert Lucking Deposition at 94-95 (R.

At that time, the 21-year-old Lucking was married to

plaintiffs' daughter, Amber Lucking, and had never been in
business on his own.

Robert Lucking Deposition at 10-12, 98.

(R. 579). The machine which plaintiffs' son-in-law wanted to
purchase cost $77,000.00.

Robert Lucking Deposition at 51, 97.

(R. 579).
Since Lucking needed financing to purchase the machine, he
sought financing from PFC, a lease broker.

PFC rejected the

initial loan application and informed Lucking that he could not
obtain financing without additional collateral.
Deposition at 42-47.

Robert Lucking

(R. 579). Plaintiffs' son-in-law

thereafter informed plaintiff Dale Larson that additional
security was needed to acquire the machine.
Deposition at 47-48.

Robert Lucking

(R. 579).

Plaintiffs Dale L. Larson ("Dale"), who was and is married
to plaintiff Grethe Larson ("Grethe"), agreed to assist his sonin-law in purchasing the machine and starting a business.

Among

other things, Dale agreed to become a co-obligor on the debt to
purchase the machine.

Dale Larson Deposition at 18-19, 36, 50,

85, 156, Grethe Larson Deposition at 34-38, Robert Lucking
Deposition at 12.

(R. 580).

In addition, as part of the lease

financing process, Dale and Grethefs property was appraised.
Grethe was present when the appraisal occurred and paid for the
appraisal herself.

Grethe Larson Deposition at 44-46, 159.

6

(R.

580).
In November, 1984, Lucking executed the leeise for the
machine.

Robert Lucking Deposition at 58-61.

(R. 580).

Dale's

name also appears on the lease which describes him as a lessee of
the machine.
the lease.

Grethe however claims that she plciced his name on

Grethe Larson Deposition at 58-63.

In any event,

Dale admits signing several documents in connection with the
lease transaction including:

(1) a Certificate of Partnership

verifying the existence of a partnership with hxs son-in-law; (2)
a Purchase Order ordering the machine; (3) a Delivery and
Acceptance Certificate acknowledging delivery of the machine; and
(4) an Equipment Lease Guarantee guaranteeing the lease
obligations.
401-404).

Complaint Paragraph 6 & Exhibits A-D.

(R. 392,

To secure performance of the lease, Grethe who often

executed documents for her husband, signed her own name and her
husband's name to a deed of trust on property which plaintiffs
owned as joint tenants.

Dale Larson Deposition at 40-41, Grethe

Larson Deposition at 69-70, 73-76, 106-107, 173-75, Complaint at
Paragraph 5.

(R. 393, 578-79, 580).

Defendant Linda Milne had virtually no involvement in the
lease transaction on which plaintiffs1 claims are based and
plaintiffs do not claim that she induced them to sign the
documents.

She did not negotiate the terms of the lease

financing agreement with plaintiffs or Lucking.

More

importantly, she made no representations to either of them to
induce them to sign any of the documents.
7

Dale Larson Deposition

at 20-21, 31-32, 118-19, 138, Grethe Larson Deposition at 42-43,
47-53, 58-79, 148-49- (R. 580-81)
of trust.

She simply notarized the deed

Complaint at Paragraph 20. (R- 396)

After the documents were executed, the lease, related
documents, and security were assigned to Overland.

Ultimately,

Lucking defaulted on the lease payments to Overland.

Overland

thereafter commenced a non-judicial foreclosure, which plaintiffs
sought to enjoin through this action.

Plaintiffs have continued

this action against Milne and Western Surety to recover damages
solely on the claim that the acknowledgement caused the loss of
their property. * Appellantsf Brief at p. 6.

In addition,

plaintiffs continue this action against Overland on a variety of
theories including fraud.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Through the Motion for Summary Judgment, defendants Milne
and Western Surety established that Milne?s notarization of the
deed of trust did not cause plaintiffs to lose their property.
As a matter of law, the deed of trust was enforceable between the
parties even if it was not notarized.

Since Overland could have

enforced the deed of trust and foreclosed without the
acknowledgement, Milne's acknowledgement did not cause the loss
of plaintiffs1 property through the foreclosure.
Originally in the District Court, and now in this Court,
plaintiffs have not identified any legal or factual theory of
causation.

The District Court's grant of summary judgment should

therefore be affirmed and defendants should be awarded damages
8

for having to defend this frivolous appeal.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE UNDISPUTED FACTS ESTABLISH, AS A MATTER OF LAW, THAT
DEFENDANT MILNE'S CONDUCT DID NOT CAUSE PLAINTIFFS TO LOSE
THEIR PROPERTY
The fundamental issue in this appeal is whether Milne's

conduct caused plaintiffs to lose their property through
foreclosure.

On this issue, the District Court found, as a

matter of law, that the undisputed facts established that Milne's
conduct did not cause plaintiffs any injury.

To prevail on this

appeal, plaintiffs must show a legal or factual basis for denying
defendants summary judgment and setting aside the District
Court's order.
In this appeal, plaintiffs have not suggested any legal or
factual basis for denying defendants summary judgment or setting
aside the District Court's order.

They do not identify any

evidence which even arguably creates a factual dispute precluding
summary judgment.

Moreover, plaintiffs do not explain how the

notarization of the deed of trust caused them to lose their
property, when foreclosure was available even without
notarization.

Instead of addressing the issues directly,

plaintiffs simply state that summary judgment is not proper since
proximate cause is "ordinarily" an issue for the trier of fact.5
5

In support of this assertion, plaintiffs cite Collins & Sons
Fine Jewelry, Inc. v. Carolina Safety Systems, Inc., 371 S.E.2d
539, 543 (S.C. App. 1988), which acknowledges that the particular
facts and circumstances of each case determine whether the question
of proximate cause can be decided as a matter of law based on the
9

Appellants1 Brief at 9-

Such arguments are insufficient to

defeat a motion for summary judgment.

See Butterfield v. Okubo,

790 P.2d 94, 97-98 (Utah App. 1990) (summary judgment in medical
malpractice action granted to defendant because no factual
dispute existed on issue of proximate cause).

See also Hunt v.

Hurst, 785 P.2d 414, 416 (Utah 1990) (negligence is "ordinarily"
a fact question but summary judgment affirmed because the
undisputed facts established no causation or negligence).
The undisputed facts supporting summary judgment and
District Court f s ruling establish that defendant Milne had
virtually no involvement with this lease financing transaction.
She did not negotiate the terms of the lease financing agreement
with plaintiffs or Lucking.

She made no representations to the

plaintiffs to induce them to become involved in the transaction
with their son-in-law; or to induce them to execute the documents
or to commit their property as collateral for the transaction.
According to the plaintiffs1 own testimony, defendant Milne did
not present the documents to the plaintiffs nor did she have any
substantive direct involvement with them concerning the terms of
the transaction.

The only involvement she had was to notarize

the deed of trust which Grethe admits signing for herself and
which she claims to have signed for her husband.

Dale Larson

Deposition at 20-21, 31-32, 118-19, 138, Grethe Larson Deposition
at 42-43, 47-53, 58-79, 148-49.

(R. 580-81).

undisputed facts.
10

Under these facts,

plaintiffs can only prevail against Milne and Western Surety if
the acknowledgement caused the loss of the property through
foreclosure.
The acknowledgement however did not cause plaintiffs to lose
their property, since Overland had the right or power to foreclosure the deed of trust regardless of whether the deed of trust
was notarized.

Notarization is not required to make a trust deed

on real property enforceable.

See Utah Code 57-1-6.6

Notarization is only required to permit recording which protects
the beneficiary of the contract from subsequent purchasers.

See

Gregerson v. Jensen, 669 P.2d 396, 398 (Utah 1983), Horman v.
Clark, 744 P.2d 1014, 1016 (Utah App. 1987).

Thus, notarization

or recording of the documents is not a prerequisite to
enforcement or foreclosure.
Applying these principles to this case, the acknowledgement
did not give Overland any right that it did not have from the
documents themselves without the acknowledgment.,

On default,

Overland, pursuant to the deed of trust, had the right to
foreclose on the plaintiffs' property whether or not the deed of
trust was notarized or recorded.

Therefore, Milne's notarization

of the deed of trust did not cause plaintiffs to lose their
property since, even without the acknowledgment, Overland would

6

Utah Law 1988, ch. 155 § 24 repeals Section 57-1-6 effective
as of July 1, 1988. Utah Law 1988, ch. 155, § 14 amended § 57-32 to provide that recording does not affect the validity of the
contract between the parties. Since the transactions at issue here
occurred prior to July 1, 1988, the earlier statute, Section 57-16, governs here.
11

have had the right to foreclose the property on default.7
Plaintiffs have made no attempt to controvert either the
legal or factual basis of defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment.

Simply stated, plaintiffs have no legal or factual

theory of how Milnefs conduct injured them.

Therefore, the Court

should affirm the District Court's ruling granting summary
judgment.8
II.

DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF DAMAGES FOR DEFENDING
THIS FRIVOLOUS APPEAL
Under Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,

Milne is entitled to an award of damages for a frivolous appeal.
Such an award is mandated in this case by the plaintiffs'
complete failure to articulate any reasonable legal or factual
basis for defeating the defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment
or for reversing the District Court's ruling.

Stated in other

7

This case is distinguishable from DeCamp v. Allen, 156 So.2d
661 (Fl. App. 1963) cited by the plaintiffs. There, unlike this
case, the court specifically found that the acknowledgement caused
the mortgage to be recorded whereby the plaintiff was damaged. Id.
at 662. In the instant case, the acknowledgement and recording
were not prerequisites to the foreclosure which caused plaintiffs'
injury.
8

Summary judgment may also be affirmed in this case on grounds
which did not exist at the time that the Motion for Summary
Judgment was filed. After summary judgment was granted, Overland
determined not to pursue its claim against Dale on the deed of
trust, Brief of Appellant Overland at p. 10 N. 2 and the District
Court recognized this fact in its Rule 54(b) Certification Order.
See Addendum III. (R. 1037-1039). As a result, Dale can suffer
no harm from the existence of the deed of trust which is not being
enforced. Similarly, Milne was not the cause of Grethe losing her
interest in the property since Grethe admits that she signed the
deed of trust and that Milne did not induce her to sign.
12

words, the Court should sanction plaintiffs because after years
of litigation and attendant costs, plaintiffs have no theory of
how Milne's conduct injured them.
Nowhere in this appeal do th€5 plaintiffs address the
fundamental issue of causation.

Plaintiffs do not attempt to

explain, with or without reference to the record or legal
precedent, how they claim Milne injured them.
challenge

They do not

the underlying premise of the summary judgment ruling,

that an acknowledgment is not a prerequisite to foreclosure.

The

reason for these deficiencies is that no such arguments exist.
This appeal is another example of plaintiffs' inability to
conduct this litigation in a reasonable manner. The record
reveals that plaintiffs have never developed a rationale,
coherent theory for recovery against Milne.

Illustrative of

this problem is plaintiffs' filing of no fewer than six
complaints seeking to state a claim for relief against Milne in
this factually simple case.
392-413).

(R. 002-003, 155-58, 245-51, 332-35,

In addition, when their own deposition testimony

revealed no apparent factual basis for their claims, plaintiffs
offered no colorable theory for recovery against defendant Milne.
Plaintiffs' inability to clearly state their position has
required all defendants to expend substantial, unnecessary fees
and costs in defending this rather simple claim.9

9

These costs

The Brief of Appellant Overland Thrift and Loan lists other
examples of the plaintiffs failure to litigate this matter
properly. See Brief of Appellant Overland Thrift and Loan at p.
2 n. 1. See also Note 3 supra.
13

are particularly significant to Ms. Milne who is forced to bear a
substantial portion of these expenses personally.
Rule 33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides a
mechanism whereby parties injured by frivolous appeals can
recover damages.

This rule mandates that just damages shall be

awarded if an appeal is deemed frivolous.

"[A] frivolous appeal

. . . is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by
existing law, not based on a good faith argument to extend,
modify, or reverse existing law."
Procedure Rule 33(b).

Utah Rules of Appellate

The court may award damages against the

party or his counsel and the award may include double costs
and/or reasonable attorneys' fees.

This appeal is a frivolous

appeal justifying an award of attorneys' fees and double costs
because it is not supported by the law or facts.

The District

Court entered summary judgment because no law or facts supported
plaintiffs' claim.

Notwithstanding the lack of evidence or a

theory of recovery, plaintiffs persisted in filing this appeal
solely on the ground that "[t]he question of proximate cause is
ordinarily a question of fact for determination by the jury."
Brief of Appellant at p. 8.

Such transparent arguments are not

sufficient to justify reversal and should be sanctioned as
frivolous.10
10

In Hunt v. Hurst, 785 P.2d 414, 416-17 (Utah 1990), the Utah
Supreme Court awarded sanctions in an analogous setting. There,
the trial court granted summary judgment on the issues of
negligence and causation
for the defendant
in a medical
malpractice. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed and awarded damages
finding: "Since a valid professional evaluation would reveal a
complete lack of merit to the cause of action and because of the
14

CONCLUSION
Plaintiffs have had every opportunity to state a claim
against these defendants and to respond to the defenses raised by
defendants Milne and Western Surety•

Plaintiff's have failed in

this regard and summary judgment has been entered.
Court's summary judgment order should be affirmed

The District
with an award

of attorneys' fees and double costs,
DATED this

/Q

day of December, 1990.
WATKISS & SAPERSTEIN

JOSEPg/T. DUNBECK, JR.
Attorneys for Linda D. Milne
and Western Surety Company

otherwise unprofessional presentation of the appeal, we hold that
plaintiff's counsel violated Rule 33 and is therefore subject to
sanction." Id. at 417.
15
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the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEES LINDA D. MILNE AND WESTERN
SURETY COMPANY, this
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day of December, 1990 to the

following:
Joseph H. Bottum, Esq.
J.H. Bottum & Associates
415 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Jeffrey M. Jones, Esq.
Michael L. Dowdle, Esq.
Robert L. Payne, Esq.
ALLEN, NELSON, HARDY & EVANS
215 South State Street, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

^ - ^ « £ C^>* ^y
4

16

A 1/^WW

( X

ADDENDUM I

Rule 56. Summary judgment
(a) For claimant A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any
part thereof
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time,
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his
favor as to all or any part thereof.
(0 Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a
genuine issue as to the amount of damages.
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a
toal is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if
Practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It
shall
thereupon make*an order specifying the facts that appear without sub8t
*atial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or
°foer relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the
jjtfion
as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be
de
emed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly.
. te) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Support!** tod opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set
^rth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidal
vit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affidal
vits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories
or farther affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judg.
ment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him.
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such
other order as is just.
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending partv or
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.

Rule 33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal; recovery
of attorney's fees.
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a first appeal of
right in a criminal case, if the court determines that a motion made or appeal
taken under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it shall award just
damages, which may include single or double costs, as defined in Rule 34,
and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court may order
that the damages be paid by the party or by the party's attorney.
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a frivolous appeal, motion,
brief, or other paper is one that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by
existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to extend, modify, or
reverse existing law. An appeal, motion, brief, or other paper interposed for
the purpose of delay is one interposed for any improper purpose such as to
harass, cause needless increase in the cost of litigation, or gain time that will
benefit only the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other paper.
(c) Procedures.
(1) The court may award damages upon request of any party or upon its
own motion. A party may request damages under this rule only as part of
the appellee's motion for summary disposition under Rule 10, as part of
the appellee's brief, or as part of a party's response to a motion or other
paper.
(2) If the award of damages is upon the motion of the court, the court
shall issue to the party or the party's attorney or both an order to show
cause why such damages should not be awarded. The order to show cause
shall set forth the allegations which form the basis of the damages and
permit at least ten days in which to respond unless otherwise ordered for
good cause shown. The order to show cause may be part of the notice of
oral argument.
(3) If requested by a party against whom damages may be awarded, the
court shall grant a hearing.
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ARTICLE 5.
CIVIL PRACTICE.
Rule 4-501. Motions.
Intent:
To establish a uniform procedure for filing motions, supporting memoranda
and documents with the court.
To establish a uniform procedure for requesting and scheduling hearings on
dispositive motions.
To establish a procedure for expedited dispositions.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to motion practice in all district and circuit courts
except proceedings before the court commissioners and the small claims department of the circuit court. This rule does not apply to petitions for habeas
corpus or other forms of extraordinary relief.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) Filing and service of motions and memoranda.
(a) Motion and supporting memoranda. All motions, except uncontested or ex-parte matters, shall be accompanied by a memorandum of
points and authorities, appropriate affidavits, and copies of or citations by
page number to relevant portions of depositions, exhibits or other documents relied upon in support of the motion. Memoranda supporting or
opposing a motion shall not exceed ten pages in length exclusive of the
"statement of material facts" as provided in paragraph (2), except as
waived by order of the court on ex-parte application. If an ex-parte application is made to file an over-length memorandum, the application shall
state the length of the principal memorandum, and if the memorandum is
in excess of ten pages, the application shall include a summary of the
memorandum, not to exceed five pages.
(b) Memorandum in opposition to motion. The responding party
shall file and serve upon all parties within ten days after service of a
motion, a memorandum in opposition to the motion, all supporting documentation and a copy of the proposed order. If the responding party fails
to file a memorandum in opposition to the motion within ten days after
service of the motion, the moving party may notify the clerk to submit the
matter to the court for decision as provided in paragraph 1(d) of this rule.
(c) Reply memorandum. The moving party may serve and file a reply
memorandum within five days after service of the responding party's
memorandum.
(d) Notice to submit for decision. Upon the expiration of the five day
period to file a reply memorandum, either party may notify the clerk to
submit the matter to the court for decision. The notification shall be in
the form of a separate written pleading and captioned "Notice to Submit
for Decision." The notification shall contain a certificate of mailing to all
parties. If neither party files a notice, the motion will not be submitted for
decision.
(2) Motions for summary judgment
(a) Memorandum in support of a motion. The points and authorities in support of a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a
section that contains a concise statement of material facts as to which
movant contends no genuine issue exists. The facts shall be stated in
separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions
of the record upon which the movant relies.
(b) Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The points and authorities in opposition to a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a
section that contains a concise statement of material facts as to which the
party contends a genuine issue exists. Each disputed fact shall be stated
in separate numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions of the record upon which the opposing party relies, and, if applicable, shall state the numbered sentence or sentences of the movant's facts
that are disputed. All material facts set forth in the movant's statement
and properly supported by an accurate reference to the record shall be
deemed admitted for the purpose of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by the opposing party's statement.
(3) Hearings.
(a) A decision on a motion shall be rendered without a hearing unless
—A^^A Uxr fkfl /vMii* nr ronuAst&d bv the narties as provided in paragraph
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(b) In cases where the granting of a motion would dispose of the action
or any issues in the action on the merits with prejudice, either party at
the time of filing the memorandum in support of or in opposition to the
motion may file a written request for a hearing
(c) Such request shall be granted unless the court finds that (a) the
motion or opposition to the motion is frivolous or (b) the dispositive issues
or set of issues governing the granting or denial of the motion has been
authoritatively decided
(d) When a request for hearing is denied, the court shall notify the
requesting party When a request for hearing is granted, the court shall
set the matter for hearing or notify the requesting party that the matter
shall be heard and the requesting party shall schedule the matter for
hearing and notify all parties of the date and time
(e) In those cases where a hearing is granted, a courtesy copy of the
motion, memorandum of points and authorities and all documents supporting or opposing the motion shall be delivered to the judge hearing the
matter at least two working days before the date set for hearing Copies
shall be clearly marked as courtesy copies and indicate the date and time
of the hearing Courtesy copies shall not be filed with the clerk of the
court.
(f) If no written request for a hearing is made at the time the parties
file their principal memoranda, a hearing on the motion shall be deemed
waived.
(g) All dispositive motions shall be heard at least thirty days before the
scheduled trial date No dispositive motions shall be heard after that date
without leave of the court
(4) Expedited dispositions. Upon motion and notice and for good cause
shown, the court may grant a request for an expedited disposition in any case
where time is of the essence and compliance with the provisions of this rule
would be impracticable or where the motion does not raise significant legal
issues and could be resolved summarily
(5) Telephone conference. The court on its own motion or at a party's
request may direct arguments of any motion by telephone conference without
court appearance. A verbatim record shall be made of all telephone arguments
and the rulings thereon if requested by counsel
(Amended effective January 15, 1990)

57-1-6. Recording necessary to impart notice — Operation
and effect — Interest of person not named in instrument.
Every conveyance of real estate, and every instrument of writing setting
forth an agreement to convey any real estate or whereby any real estate may
be affected, to operate as notice to third persons shall be proved or acknowledged and certified in the manner prescribed by this title and recorded in the
office of the recorder of the county in which such real estate is situated, but
shall be valid and binding between the parties thereto without such proofs,
acknowledgment, certification or record, and as to all other persons who have
had actual notice Neither the fact that an instrument, recorded as herein
provided, recites only a nominal consideration, nor the fact that the grantee in
such instrument is designated as trustee, or that the conveyance otherwise
purports to be in trust without naming the beneficiaries or stating the terms
of the trust, shall operate to charge any third person with notice of the inter
est of any person or persons not named in such instrument or of the grantor or
grantors; but the grantee may convey the fee or such lesser interest as was
conveyed to him by such instrument free and clear of all claims not disclosed
by the instrument or by an instrument recorded as herein provided setting
forth the names of the beneficiaries, specifying the interest claimed and describing the property charged with such interest.

57-3-2. Record imparts notice ~~~ Change in interest rate —
Validity of document — Notice of unnamed interests — Conveyance by grantee.
(1) Each document executed, acknowledged, and certified, in the manner
prescribed by this title, each original document or certified copy of a document
complying with Section 57-4a-3, whether or not acknowledged, each copy of a
notice of location complying with Section 40-1-4, and each financing statement complying with Section 70A-9-402, whether or not acknowledged shall,
from the time of filing with the appropriate county recorder, impart notice to
all persons of their contents.
(2) If a recorded document was given as security, a change in the interest
rate in accordance with the terms of an agreement pertaining to the underlying secured obligation does not affect the notice or alter the priority of the
document provided under Subsection (1).
(3) This section does not affect the validity of a document with respect to
the parties to the document and all other persons who have notice of the
document.
(4) The fact that a recorded document recites only a nominal consideration,
names the grantee as trustee, or otherwise purports to be in trust without
naming beneficiaries or stating the terms of the trust does not charge any
third person with notice of any interest of the grantor or of the interest of any
other person not named in the document.
(5) The grantee in a recorded document may convey the interest granted to
him free and clear of all claims not disclosed in the document in which he
a
Ppears as grantee or in any other document recorded in accordance with this
tole that sets forth the names of the beneficiaries, specifies the interest
claimed, and describes the real property subject to the interest.
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Attorneys for Defendants Linda D. Milne and Western Surety Company

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
DALE L. LARSON, GRETHE LARSON,
and SYSTEMATIC BUILDERS, INC.,
a Utah Corporation,

:
:
:

ORDER GRANTING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

:

Civil No. C 87-3405

OVERLAND THRIFT AND LOAN, a
Utah Corporation, B. RAY ZOLL,
Trustee, LINDA D. MILNE, and
WESTERN SURETY COMPANY,

:
:
:
:

Judge Scott Daniels

Defendants.

:

Plaintiffs,
vs.

This matter came before the Court upon the Motion for Summary I
Judgment of Defendants Linda D. Milne and Western Surety Company I
i
and Defendants' Notice of Request to Submit Motion for Summary |
Judgment for Decision, the Court having reviewed the file and j
pleadings and memoranda herein and for good cause appearing j
therefor,

{

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants1 Motion for Summary j
Judgment

is granted,

and

Plaintiffs' Complaint,

as

finally i
i

amended, and claims against Defendants Linda D. Milne and Western J
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Surety Company are dismissed with prejudice and upon the merits
DATED this

I

day of F ^ a r y , 1990.
BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE SCOTT DANIELS
District Court Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed in the
offices of Watkiss & Saperstein, and in such capacity I hand
delivered a true copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT to the following this ^ 1 /—

day of January, 1990:

Joseph H. Bottum, Esq.
J. H. Bottum & Associates
415 Kearns Building
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Royal K. Hunt, Esq.
1871 West 7800 South
West Jordan, Utah 84084
Jeffrey M. Jones, Esq.
Michael L. Dowdle, Esq.
Robert L. Payne, Esq.
Allen, Nelson, Hardy & Evans
215 South State Street, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
WATKISS & SAPERSTEIN
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ADDENDUM III

Michael L. Dowdle, Esq. (4025)
Robert L. Payne, Esq. (5129)
ALLEN NELSON HARDY & EVANS
Attorneys for Defendant
Overland Thrift & Loan
215 South State Street, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-8400
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

DALE L. LARSON, GRETHE
LARSON, and SYSTEMATIC
BUILDERS, INC., a Utah
corporation,

]

ORDER

Plaintiffs,
vs.
OVERLAND THRIFT AND LOAN,
a Utah corporation, LINDA
D. MILNE and WESTERN SURETY
COMPANY,
Defendants.

j
;
I

Civil NO. C87-3405

]i

Judge Scott Daniels

The Motion of Defendant Overland for an Order of
this Court appointment referee and ordering sale came on
regularly

for

hearing

and

oral

argument

before

the

undersigned, and during the hearing Plaintiff's counsel moved
the Court for an order certifying, pursuant to Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure 54(b), the orders and judgments entered herein
on the motions of the Defendants for summary judgment, and
counsel having stipulated that all issues regarding Dale
Larsonfs execution of the Trust Deed and/or Grethe Larson's
authorization to sign the Trust Deed on behalf of Dale Larson
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may be dismissed or otherwise withdrawn from litigation, and
it therefore appearing to the court that Plaintiff's motion
should be granted, it is therefore,
ORDERED that in accordance with the provisions of
Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure the summary
judgment or judgment in favor of Defendants Milne and Western
Surety Company entered herein, and Order and Judgment dated
March 27, 1990, and Order and the Judgment dated May 18, 1990,
in favor of Defendant Overland, are certified to be final
judgments, the Court finding that there is no just reason for
delay, and expressly directs entry of judgment.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Plaintiffs, Dale
Larson and Grethe Larson, shall have thirty (30) days from the
date of this Order within which to file a notice of appeal
appealing from the herein referred to judgments and within
which to file a supersedeas bond in accordance with the Rule
of Appellate Procedure.

Should Plaintiffs fail to file such

notice of appeal and supersedeas bond within thirty (30) days
from the date of this Order, the court will appoint a referee
and issue an order of sale in accordance with the motion of
the Defendant Overland Thrift & Loan.
DATED this

')&

day of June, 1990.
BY THE COURT:

O cjifC)

//UJ?y,

Honorable Scott Daniels
District Court Judge
2
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND-DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on the 31st day of May, 1990,
I did cause to be hand-delivered a true and accurate copy of
the foregoing ORDER to the following:
Joseph Bottums, Esq.
BOTTOM, J.H. & ASSOCIATES
13 6 South Main
Suite #418
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Joseph T. Dunbeck, Jr.
WATKISS & SAPERSTEIN
310 South Main
Suite #1200

S a l t Lake City, Utah

84101
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